The media industry is
in a frenzy.
AT&T is
buying Time Warner for $85 billion after overcoming a challenge from the Justice
Department. The Murdoch family has agreed to sell the majority of its 21st
Century Fox empire to Disney.
Comcast plans to crash that deal with a higher
offer. It has also outbid Fox for the remaining 61 percent of European pay-TV
provider Sky. Those two deals together could total $100 billion when the
bidding is done.
Viacom and CBS
continue to dance around merging. Discovery closed
a $14.6 billion acquisition for Scripps Networks in March. Lionsgate completed
its $4.4 billion deal purchase of Starz in December.
There's been a drastic
change among legacy media company executives the last two years. Their CEOs
won't say it publicly, but they're saying it privately: The pay-TV bundle, the
lifeblood of the U.S. media ecosystem for decades, is dying.
There's a lot of
places to blame. Competition on mobile devices. Video games. Even the internet
in general.
But executives at most
traditional media companies agree that Netflix, if not directly responsible, is
at least holding the murder weapon. The 21-year-old company that was once best
known for killing DVD rental giant Blockbuster has pivoted its entire business
around the idea that streaming video delivered over the internet will replace
the linear TV.
Consumers seem to
agree. Netflix gained 92 million customers in the last five years while the
number of people who pay for cable declines year after year. That dynamic has
persuaded investors to believe in Netflix's high-risk business model of running
cash-flow negative to outspend traditional media companies for content. It has
let Netflix strike deals with everyone from David Letterman to Ryan Murphy
to Barack Obama.
And the more Netflix
spends, the more investors cheer.
The success of Netflix
in the market is why we're seeing "the greatest rearranging of the media
industry chessboard in history," according to BTIG media analyst Rich
Greenfield.
But chasing scale
isn't the answer for every media company, according to Netflix CFO
David Wells.
"Not everybody's
going to get big," Wells said in an interview. "The strategic
question is, 'what type of business do I want to be in the next five or 10
years?'"
So legacy giants are
now beginning to contemplate how to beat Netflix at its own game. Comcast,
which owns CNBC parent NBCUniversal, has had preliminary talks with AT&T to
start an over-the-top digital streaming service with NBCUniversal and Warner
Bros. content, according to people familiar with the matter. Discovery is also
pondering its own OTT service, potentially with a global technology company,
said other sources. Disney is debuting its streaming service next year.
Wells is skeptical
about this approach.
"The consumer
doesn't want 100 direct-to-consumer services," he said. "The consumer
wants great breadth and amazing personalization so they can find something in
30 seconds instead of five minutes."
While traditional
media is racing to catch up, Netflix CEO Reed
Hastingsis not looking back at the runners he's passed.
Hastings has never
really feared legacy media, said Neil Rothstein, who worked at Netflix from
2001 to 2012 and eventually ran digital global advertising for the company.
That's because Hastings bought into the fundamental principle of "The
Innovator's Dilemma," the 1997 business strategy book by Harvard Business
School professor Clayton Christensen.
That book, often cited
in tech circles, explains how disruptive businesses often start off as cheaper
alternatives with lesser functionality, making it difficult for big incumbents
to respond without cannibalizing their cash-rich businesses. Over time, the
newcomer adds features and builds customer loyalty until it's just as good or
better than the incumbent's product. By the time the old guard wakes up, it's too
late.
"Reed brought 25
or 30 of us together, and we discussed the book," Rothstein said of an
executive retreat he remembered nearly a decade ago. "We studied AOL and
Blockbuster as cautionary tales. We knew we had to disrupt, including disrupting
ourselves, or someone else would do it."
There's no guarantee
Netflix can keep up its big spending without seeing its stock fall back to
Earth. But the media giants can no longer afford to wait and find out.
The unfair fight
Let's say you're a
carpenter, and you make furniture out of mahogany. You pay for mahogany wood
and sell a finished product for a profit. You've been doing this for years, and
you've made a good living from it.
One day, a new guy —
let's call him Reed Hastings — moves in next door. At first, Reed seems
awesome. After looking through your store, he buys a bunch of the dusty pieces
in the back no one else wanted.
But after a while,
Reed decides to get into the furniture manufacturing business, too. And now
he's telling your mahogany supplier that he'll pay 50 percent more for the same
wood. Then another competitor, a rich fellow named Jeff Bezos, shows up across the
street. He wants the mahogany, too, and he's bidding 75 percent more.
This is crazy, you
think. How are these guys able to afford to pay so much more for the same
stuff? They've got to be passing along the costs to their customers, right?
But they're not. You
walk in their store, and they're selling the same quality furniture you make
for less than you sell it. And cash from investors is pouring in.
You say, what the
hell? I'll up my spending, too. This is the new world, I guess. So you bid 100
percent more for mahogany. Instantly, your stock falls. "Boo!" say
your investors. "Your business model is dying!"
This sounds like a
Franz Kafka novel. But this allegory explains the current plight of legacy
media.
Imagine Lionsgate is
the mahogany carpenter. Lionsgate develops original and licensed movies and TV
shows; it pays for the talent and the production costs and receives money in
return from cable channels, digital outlets, TV networks and so on. It owns the
"Hunger Games" franchise, "Mad Men" and "Orange is the
New Black." That last one, of course, runs on Netflix.
For years, Netflix was
a welcome addition to the media landscape because it bought a lot of library
content that was old or not that popular. Plus, Netflix didn't get in the way
of the two main ways content providers make money — signing deals with pay-TV
operators like Comcast, Charter, AT&T and Dish Network, and taking cash
from advertisers. Working with Netflix was like finding free money.
But the programmers
kept asking for higher fees, especially on costly sports rights, and that
pushed cable bills higher. Meanwhile, Netflix customers loved the low price —
originally less than $8 a month compared with $80 or $100 for cable. When
Netflix started offering a handful of original shows, such as "House of
Cards" and "Orange Is The New Black," viewers kept coming, and
the company's valuation swelled.
Five years ago,
Netflix was trading at about $32 per share. Today, Netflix trades at about $370
a share. That's a gain of 1,050 percent.
Over the same period,
Lionsgate is down about 15 percent.
A lot of media CEOs
believe Netflix is winning because the game is rigged in its favor. Their
complaints focus on how companies are valued by investors.
Lionsgate's enterprise
value (EV), a good measure of a company's worth, is about $7.5 billion. Its
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over
the last 12 months was $520 million. So, Lionsgate trades at a trailing
EV/EBITDA multiple of about 14. Discovery, Disney and Viacom all trade at
trailing multiples lower than 14.
Netflix has an
enterprise value of $165 billion and EBITDA of $1.1 billion, giving it a
multiple of about 150.
That's the equivalent
of a huge cheering section, throwing money at the company to keep spending.
Indeed, Netflix is now
the number one spender on media content outside of sports rights, according to
consulting firm SNL Kagan.
Can the spending game last?
Some traditional media
execs and analysts are skeptical that Netflix can keep it up.
"To be worth $150
billion, someday you've got to make at least $10 billion in EBITDA," Steve
Burke, CEO of CNBC parent company NBCUniversal, said in an interview.
"There's at least a chance Netflix never makes that."
Netflix spends more
money than it takes in each year, funding the gaps with debt. Last year, it
posted free cash flow of almost negative $2 billion and has forecast that it
could be negative $4 billion in 2018. Netflix's
path forward is tied to massive international growth, which will require
spending billions more on original programming.
If you think Netflix
should trade like a traditional media company, Burke's got a pretty good case
Netflix is insanely overvalued. Even Hastings acknowledges Netflix looks more
like a media company than a technology company, which tend to trade at much higher
multiples.
"We'll spend over
$10 billion on content and marketing and $1.3 billion on tech," Hastings
said in his April 16 quarterly earnings conference call. "So just
objectively, we're much more of a media company in that way than pure
tech."
The music will stop
for Netflix if it can't quit burning money, said Wedbush Securities analyst
Michael Pachter, who has a sell rating on the stock and a price target of $140
per share.
"Netflix has
burned more cash every year since 2013," Pachter said.
As of the end of the
first quarter, Netflix had $6.54 billion in long-term debt and $17.9 billion in
streaming content payment obligations, with only $2.6 billion in cash and
equivalents on hand. In April, Netflix raised $1.9 billion of 5.875 percent
senior notes.
"What happens
when they need to keep increasing their spending and suddenly they have $10
billion of debt? People are going to start asking, 'can this company pay us
back?' If that happens, their lending rate will spike. If Netflix needs to
raise capital, they'll issue stock. And that's when investors will get
spooked," Pachter said.
Even if his logic is
sound, Pachter has been wrong for years on Netflix. Its stock has just kept
rising.
Netflix executives
even posted a 2005 comment of his on a wall at their Los Gatos, California,
headquarters and would chuckle at it as they walked by. It read: "Netflix
is a worthless piece of crap with really nice people running it."
Hastings: Everyone uses cash wrong
Netflix's use of cash
is strategic, even though it's not a typical corporate practice, according to
Hastings.
"It's horrible
how mismanaged most Silicon Valley companies are in capital," Hastings
said in a 2015 interview with venture capitalist John Doerr, a partner at
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and early backer of tech giants like Google and Amazon.
"Microsoft always
wanted to have a lot of cash on hand. Apple had no cash 15 years ago in 2000.
Who did the most innovation? The cash does not help. The cash insolates you in
a bad way. It's a bad thing that companies store cash."
From October 2016:
Reed Hastings on AT&T-Time Warner, acquisition speculation:
The long-term bull
case for Netflix is that its subscriber growth, coupled with incremental price
increases, will eventually propel earnings and cash flow.
BTIG's Greenfield
predicts Netflix will increase its global subscribers from 125 million to 200
million by 2020. Bank of America analyst Nat Schindler estimates Netflix will
have 360 million subscribers by 2030. Netflix estimates the total addressable
market of subscribers, not including China, could be about 800 million.
Meanwhile, the number
of traditional cable and satellite pay-TV households falls each year, and the
declines are accelerating. Research firm Statista predicts there will be 95
million U.S. pay-TV households by 2020, down from 100 million in 2015.
The bigger Netflix
gets, the more A+ talent will want to sign exclusive deals with Netflix instead
of traditional media companies. It's a virtuous cycle, as top talent then
accelerates subscriber growth. It's also a death spiral for the weakest
traditional media players.
Netflix has another
edge in the content wars. While networks make decisions on TV ratings, Netflix
plays a different game. Its barometer for success is based on how much it spent
on a show rather than hoping every show is a blowout hit, said Barry Enderwick,
who worked in Netflix's marketing department from 2001 to 2012 and who was
director of global marketing and subscriber acquisition. Since Netflix is not
beholden to advertisers, niche shows can be successful, as long as Netflix
controls spending. That also gives Netflix the luxury of being able to order
full seasons of shows, which appeals to talent.
"If you're a
typical studio, you raise money for a pilot, and if it tests well, you pick up
the show, maybe you make a few more episodes, and you wait for the
ratings," said Enderwick.
"At Netflix, our
data made our decisions for us, so we'd just order two seasons. Show creators
would ask us, 'do you want to see notes? Don't you want to see a pilot?' We'd
respond, 'If you want us to.' Creators were gobsmacked."
That dynamic has led
some content makers to decide they're better off working directly for Netflix,
which now spends more on content than many TV networks.
Last year, Netflix
signed Shonda Rhimes, creator of "Grey's Anatomy" and
"Scandal," to a multiyear contract after more than a decade at ABC
Studios. Earlier this year, Netflix signed a deal with Ryan Murphy, creator of
"Nip/Tuck," "American Horror Story" and "Glee,"
to a deal that could reach $300 million, according to Deadline Hollywood. He left Fox TV for the
Netflix offer and spurned a counteroffer from Disney. And Jenji Kohan, who
created "Orange is The New Black" for Lionsgate? She left for
Netflix, too.
Fighting back
So if you're a big
media company, how do you fight back? What if you're Comcast or Charter or AT&T?
How do you stop customers from ditching pay TV services for Netflix?
Compete
Disney is farthest
ahead in its plan to fight Netflix head-on.
It's removing all of
its movies from Netflix at the end of the year and starting its own service for
lovers of Disney and Pixar titles. Disney's digital over-the-top service will
launch in 2019 and include movies and TV shows from the Disney-ABC TV Group library.
Fox's film and TV library would bolster this service, if Disney completes that
deal.
NBCUniversal may be
forced into offering a streaming service of its own, potentially with partners
who can generate enough must-have content that it becomes enticing to customers
with and without cable.
NBCUniversal
executives have discussed launching a rival OTT service that would include
Universal and Warner Bros. programming, according to people familiar with the
matter, although it may not happen if NBCUniversal parent company Comcast
succeeds in grabbing Fox from out of Disney's hands. Outside of Fox, NBC views
Warner's library of programming as the strongest among potential partners, with
Sony No. 2, one of the people said. (AT&T and NBCUniversal spokespeople declined
to comment.)
Discovery, too, is
considering an OTT product, according to people familiar with the matter —
perhaps in conjunction with a global tech platform that can showcase its
nonfiction programming — an area where Netflix isn't as strong.
"You look at the
FAANGs (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google), and their strategy is
focused primarily on scripted movies and scripted series," Discovery CEO
David Zaslav said. "Discovery is probably the most effective nonfiction
producer in the world. I like our hand given we own all of our content."
A Discovery spokesman
declined to comment on plans for the OTT service.
There are several
problems with competing with Netflix by offering rival online services. Netflix
already has a huge first-mover advantage. Stand-alone digital services aren't
where legacy media companies want to spend their money. Programming costs are
high, and the result may just cannibalize their existing pay-TV model, which
brings in billions of dollars from subscriber fees and ads. And just because
the market has rewarded Netflix for its strategy doesn't mean investors will
cheer on late competitors for following the same model.
Consolidate
AT&T CEO Randall
Stephenson told CNBC earlier this year that the Time
Warner deal is a direct response to Netflix.
"Reality is, the
biggest distributor of content out there is totally vertically
integrated," said Stephenson. "This happens to be somebody called
Netflix. But they create original content; they aggregate original content; and
they distribute original content. This thing is moving at lightning
speed."
The desire to gain
scale to take on Netflix is also driving interest by Disney and Comcast in
Fox's assets, which include Fox's movie studio, some cable networks and stakes
in Sky, Endemol Shine Group, and Hulu.
But getting bigger
isn't the answer for everyone, said Wells.
"Some brands are
big enough to compete to be another Netflix, or another YouTube, and vie for
the global consumer media dollar," said Wells. "But not everybody's
going to be in that bucket. They may want to specialize in content production,
and that may be a better business for them."
Capitulate
Comcast and Charter
have actually accelerated Netflix's growth by allowing Netflix subscribers
access to their programming through their cable boxes. Their strategy is if
people are going to watch Netflix anyway, they might as well bundle it with
cable service and improve the overall experience. That way, customers can
subscribe to both.
Because these cable
giants are also Internet providers, they also have a theoretical weapon in
their back pocket — the ability to throttle Netflix speeds in the new era
without net neutrality safeguards, or at least charge customers for using data
via Netflix while keeping home-grown cable applications exempt from usage caps.
"We could
experience discriminatory or anti-competitive practices that could impede our
growth, cause us to incur additional expense or otherwise negatively affect our
business," Netflix acknowledges in its annual report.
But this isn't much of
a fear for Netflix. The company knows cable and wireless companies need
broadband growth more than video growth to keep flourishing, and few companies
drive internet usage like Netflix. T-Mobile now offers its customers Netflix
for free.
How does this end?
Big Media isn't going
to just disappear like Blockbuster. A company like CBS, with a market
capitalization of $20 billion, had EBITDA of about $3 billion last year —
that's three times as much as Netflix. Many sports rights are still locked up
for years by old media companies. That will keep affiliate fees and advertising
dollars coming.
But Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Google have
massive valuations and cash hoards compared with media companies. They, too,
have the balance sheets to spend billions on video without seeing a major dent
in their stock prices. And as young consumers get older, the days of paying for
a bundle of TV channels may be waning.
So how does this end?
Netflix's answer is again in a business strategy book.
Hastings derived many
of his strategy lessons from a Stanford instructor named Hamilton Helmer.
Hastings even invited him to Netflix in 2010 to teach other executives.
One of Helmer's key
concepts is called counter-positioning, which Helmer defines as: "A
newcomer adopts a new, superior business model which the incumbent does not
mimic due to anticipated damage to their existing business."
"Throughout my
business career, I have often observed powerful incumbents, once lauded for
their business acumen, failing to adjust to a new competitive reality,"
Hastings writes in the forward to Helmer's book "7 Powers," published
in 2016.
"The result is a
stunning fall from grace."